ABSTRACT
Chapter 1:An Equilibrium Model of Traffic Accidents: from the Peltzman Effect on Autonomous Cars We propose a population game to analyze drivers' driving behavior. Each driver interacts with a myriad of other drivers in a strategic substitute fashion, namely other drivers' reckless behavior encourages me to drive more carefully. We establish a set of reasonable assumptions, under which this game admits a unique Nash Equilibrium. This allows us to analyze the question that Peltzman (1975) raised: If the driving environment improves, drivers respond by driving more incautiously. Can this reaction lead to more auto accidents? To this end, we derive a sufficient condition that rules out this possibility. We then justify this sufficient condition using an empirical regularity we discover from data regarding mutual accidents between different groups of drivers. Throughout the analysis, we provide a definition of potential games for a continuum of players, where the interaction term depends also on their types. Also, the comparative statics result we produced, can be applied to a range of games with strategic substitutesChapter 2: Information Asymmetry in an Epidemic: A Game Theoretical Analysis of Communication Failure In an epidemic, individuals reduce social activities to protect themselves from getting infected. This also protects others from potential infections, but utility-maximizing individuals do not consider this spillover effect. Consequently, individuals choose a social activity that is higher than the regulator's preferred social optimum. When facing a novel disease such as COVID-19, the public often lacks knowledge of certain disease attributes such as the pass-through rate, the mortality rate, the number of current infections, etc. On the other hand, the regulator is often better informed. We build a game theoretic model to study how the regulator strategically communicates to the public, in the presence of misaligned incentives caused by the spillover effect. When the public uncertainty is large and the disease reproduction rate is high, the regulator loses credibility, and cannot reveal any information to the public. Communication failure can lead to the public under (or over) reactions. Compartmental models that overlook this information friction can significantly under-estimate the future infection rate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)
ABSTRACT
Since the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Germany, the German government has introduced various measures to counteract the pandemic. The implementation of safety measures can have counterproductive effects: people engage in risk compensatory behavior (fewer safety behaviors) after regulations are introduced and obligated by the government, which is known as the Peltzman effect (Peltzman, 1975). Based on the Peltzman effect, the researchers of this study hypothesized that people complied less with safety behaviors and took more health risks (e.g. keep less distance) after the implementation of more stringent COVID-19-related regulations (quarantine obligation and face mask duty) between the two measurement periods of this study. They also extended the Peltzman model by hypothesizing moderating roles of age, gender, and perceived COVID-19 threat. Results of the longitudinal survey study (N = 989, T1: 26 March - 31 March 2020 and T2: 27 April - 4 May 2020) confirm that people indeed complied less with safety recommendations over time associated with strengthened COVID-19-related regulations. Perceived COVID-19 threat to those in a person's surroundings (e.g. family, neighbors) had a positive impact on compliance, but age and gender had no effect. This extends the literature on the Peltzman effect by adding perceived COVID-19 threat as a new relevant construct, enabling the development of more effective safety preventions in the future.
ABSTRACT
Reports show that other ordinary childhood infections like measles or Influenza are likely to reemerge. The re-emergence of infectious diseases may happen due to the direct impact of the pandemic on the community because of decreased access to health and medical services, interrupted transport systems, weaknesses in the supply chain, flight restrictions, closings of the border, and international trade problems. The most prevalent cause [60.9%] for low vaccine uptake and coverage during the current pandemic was fear of exposure to the COVID-19 virus outside the home. The expectation and hope that the pattern of reduction in transmission and number of influenza cases will continue over the next flu season depend on continued adherence to nonpharmaceutical interventions and their long-term application. But there is always the fear and threat of increasing the spread of Influenza by reducing the movement restrictions and low adherence to protective health measures due to vaccination. So far, not much information has been published about the interaction between different infectious diseases in the background of the coronavirus pandemic and related interventions. The purpose of this article is to examine the general effects of the Covid-19 vaccination on the spread of Influenza in the coming seasons.
ABSTRACT
Chapter 1:An Equilibrium Model of Traffic Accidents: from the Peltzman Effect on Autonomous Cars We propose a population game to analyze drivers' driving behavior. Each driver interacts with a myriad of other drivers in a strategic substitute fashion, namely other drivers' reckless behavior encourages me to drive more carefully. We establish a set of reasonable assumptions, under which this game admits a unique Nash Equilibrium. This allows us to analyze the question that Peltzman (1975) raised: If the driving environment improves, drivers respond by driving more incautiously. Can this reaction lead to more auto accidents? To this end, we derive a sufficient condition that rules out this possibility. We then justify this sufficient condition using an empirical regularity we discover from data regarding mutual accidents between different groups of drivers. Throughout the analysis, we provide a definition of potential games for a continuum of players, where the interaction term depends also on their types. Also, the comparative statics result we produced, can be applied to a range of games with strategic substitutesChapter 2: Information Asymmetry in an Epidemic: A Game Theoretical Analysis of Communication Failure In an epidemic, individuals reduce social activities to protect themselves from getting infected. This also protects others from potential infections, but utility-maximizing individuals do not consider this spillover effect. Consequently, individuals choose a social activity that is higher than the regulator's preferred social optimum. When facing a novel disease such as COVID-19, the public often lacks knowledge of certain disease attributes such as the pass-through rate, the mortality rate, the number of current infections, etc. On the other hand, the regulator is often better informed. We build a game theoretic model to study how the regulator strategically communicates to the public, in the presence of misaligned incentives caused by the spillover effect. When the public uncertainty is large and the disease reproduction rate is high, the regulator loses credibility, and cannot reveal any information to the public. Communication failure can lead to the public under (or over) reactions. Compartmental models that overlook this information friction can significantly under-estimate the future infection rate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)
ABSTRACT
World is still struggling with widespread dissemination and many unanswered questions about Coronavirus disease-19(COVID-19). Global efforts introduced several candidate vaccines against causing COVID-19, mostly requires require 2 doses of injections and some with about 90-95% efficacy. All strategies against the spread of infection are placed on breaking the chain of virus transmission though protective public health measures and mass vaccination, as yet. The current situation emphasis on the global need for carefully designed policies to maximize vaccine access and uptake. The risk compensation theory states that a drop in perceived risk caused by access to prevention measures may lead to an increase in risky behaviors. The current pandemic has faced people to the sense of risk compensation and behavior change in response to a perceived risk level. Risk compensation phenomenon may significantly defeat the benefits of COVID-19 vaccination, especially if the vaccine is not very effective in real life or in high-risk populations. Acknowledging and be conscious of Peltzman risk compensation has crucial importance in counteracting and neutralizing the false complacency of community also lend more weight to public health efforts. The public health messages and practices should be clearly expressed, straightforward, reliable and applicable. It is important that as efforts made to encourage mass vaccination of population other NPIs needs to be re-established and implemented to ensuring strike the balance of learning to live with COVID-19 in parallel with daily activities and job tasks.